People were indeed more worried about the possibility of an attack from the East 38 than from the West. In addition, within Yugoslavia itself, there was potentially more support for Soviet-state socialism than for Western-type liberal democracy. The main values advocated were egalitarianism and social justice. Paradoxically, while the elite promoted less state and more society self-management , many in the population demanded more order and more state intervention, especially when the downward spiral of the economy and of political disintegration was well advanced by the s.
The image of the West was now in sharp contrast with that of the East. Support for Tito was almost in linear correlation with the danger people felt from the Soviet Union. It was becoming more and more dependent on the existence of the Soviet Other. This would have dramatic consequences once the Soviet Other ceased to exist, in the second half of the s. It opposed them with much more vigilance than the liberal democrats and pro-Western groups. In the s, the founding congress of a new alternative Communist Party of Yugoslavia in Bar was prevented from meeting and the organizers were all arrested.
In fact, Yugoslav socialism offered them more than either a Soviet or Western sort of political system would, as some would discover a decade after the break-up of the state.
- Methodological considerations: conducting oral history among blue-collar Belgraders;
- High-Maintenance Employees: Why Your Best People Will Also Be Your Most Difficult...and What You Can Do about It.
- Was Milosevic's Serbia socialist? | Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal?
- Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization!
- Caltech Library!
The trends towards globalization as Kardelj dubbed it back in 50 would make nationalism and separatism a relic of the past. Barriers between states, including the Berlin Wall, would be torn down, and Yugoslavia would become an example of diverse cultures living side by side with one another in their own republics, with their own rights and in peace. Nationalism simply could not prevail over such a prospect. Thus, there was no real danger of it. They would be able to find a program, to find allies in Yugoslavia, to find them outside of Yugoslavia. Their chance to realize this program has gone, it does not exist in Yugoslavia, but with pressure on Yugoslavia from abroad this would become possible.
And I think that it is possible for them, if not exactly to form a government, then certainly to create a serious political movement supported by this pressure from abroad, and also by their own forces within the country. Of course, the main support for this program would be bureaucratic centralism and Cominformism. Ultimately, one may now better understand why the Yugoslav elite was totally unprepared and surprised when the Soviet system collapsed and liberalism, contrary to their expectations, entered the Yugoslav identity-making arena and emerged victorious.
Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization
The fact is, it came hand in hand with nationalism. Only if socialist was Yugoslavia worth preserving and fighting for. But not only that: to Yugoslav Communists they were ultimately impossible. But instruments that would in other types of social projects help strengthen internal cohesion, such as ethnic similarities, state centralism or nationalism in both the civic and ethnic sense, were treated as hostile Others. They were essential parts either of past domestic concepts interwar Yugoslavism or parallel but undesirable concepts of socialism such as Soviet statism.
They were therefore unacceptable to Yugoslav official identity formulators. Without these potential instruments of cohesion, Yugoslav Communists placed not only the identity but also the existence of Yugoslavia entirely on the back of their own ideology.
Serbia's Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization
Their commitment to Marxism prompted them to underestimate the chance for liberal democracy or nationalism to compete with socialism as a vision of the future society. The collapse of their own ideology, and the collapse of that Soviet Other, left Yugoslavia without both pillars of identity: internal cohesion and an external difference. This joint collapse, and not ethnic hatred, nationalism or the economic crisis, was the main reason why it disintegrated. In Serbia, we felt him to be a heavy burden. We wanted to put the lid on this.
In general, he was a reformist and a Yugoslav. There have been in this criticism of statism overtones of national postures, i. Well and good, we are now liquidating that statism and the federal government will have left to it very little of the kind of competence and very few of the kind of affairs which could be said to favor one or the other republic.
But we must now see to it that this statism is not divided up among the republics. So long as the proletariat uses the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such shall cease to exist. Democracy itself as a political system is a form of authority, and therefore a form of dictatorship.
Such efforts simultaneously create the conditions for the withering away of the state in general and, by the same token, for the withering away of the state characterized by the dictatorship of the proletariat in all its forms, including the present self-managing democratic form. Instead of democracy as a form of state system, there will be a democracy and freedom of the individual, who is no longer the subject of the state but governs himself and regulates social relationships as the relationships between man and things and not between man and man.
In such circumstances, the state apparatus will turn into a specialized public service of the selfmanaging society. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the dictatorship of the proletariat and democracy, but there is a contradiction between the centralized power of the state and its apparatus, whatever form it may take, on the one hand, and the self-management aspirations of man and his interest unions on the other. It in fact performs the same role as the multiparty system of bourgeois pluralism, the only difference being that power is wielded by one party rather than by several parties in turn.
Actually, there is very little difference there, because the political parties in bourgeois society—with the exception of the revolutionary parties of the working class—do not differ greatly in their attitude towards the existing social system. However, the one-party system, even more than political pluralism, is susceptible to serious deformations of various kinds. In the first place, there is a tendency for the party leadership to form a personal union with the state executive apparatus, and thus the executive becomes the tool of technocratic and bureaucratic forces in society.
The Paris Commune and Marx were both aware of this danger, but it has never been more real than in contemporary socialist practice today. The one-party system of the Stalinist type came about when the mechanism of bourgeois parliamentarism was simply grafted on to the system of socialist socio-economic relations. The one-party system took two features from the political system of bourgeois society which make it incompatible with the system of self-management. Firstly, like the bourgeois parliamentary system, it excluded the individual from having a direct hand in governing society. This kind of dogmatic theory has fundamentally affected the development of the political systems in contemporary socialism.
Of course, everyday life has modified it and continues to do so, but it has caused socialist practice—particularly the development of socialist democracy—considerable harm. Socialist practice has shown what pitfalls and hazards are involved in an exclusive orientation toward a one-party political system. The greatest danger presented by such a system for Yugoslavia would be that the League of Communists should become an integral part or even an appendage of a technocratic-bureaucratic monopoly.
Hence such a system does not suit our system of self-managing pluralism precisely because of its machinery. The long-term creative role of the League of Communists consists primarily in its efforts and ability to make a theoretical and scientific assessment of the objective laws ruling the trends and development of socialist society, to correlate these trends on a day-to-day basis with the aspirations and interests of the self-managing subjects … and to mobilize the broad working masses in a drive to achieve the goals which are set on the basis of these assessments.
This means that the Yugoslav political system, far from being a one-party system, actually precludes any such system, just as it precludes the multiparty pluralism of bourgeois society. Self-management and self-managing democracy cannot tolerate political monopoly by any forces outside the democratically integrated system of social self-management. It is precisely from this self-managing democratic integration that the organization of the state and of its highest executive organs emanates.
If a feature of the one-party system is still present in this state system, it is only as an instrument to defend the survival and further development of our self-managing and democratically integrated socialist society. The more stable the system of self-managing democracy becomes, the less prominent this attribute of the one-party system will become.
The Securitisation of Ethnicity in Serbia ()
What needs to be done above all is to democratize society even further on the principles of self-management by the working man and citizen. Only such a status of the working people in society can lead to the withering away and abolition of the class system of society in general, and thereby secure democracy and freedom for all.
The aggressor would, according to estimates by the Yugoslav military leadership, with no special preparations, be able to move against our country about 15—20 divisions, of which four were air and parachute divisions with seven brigades. They would deploy strong air and tank units. The role of the enlightened vanguard in socialism was to be both the ultimate interpreter of reality and visionary of the future and the force changing it in the direction of the vision. Communists, therefore, had a duty to study and then to teach Marxism.
He was both the supreme interpreter of Marxism and the chairman of the Constitution Commission for all postwar Yugoslav Constitutions. It is more about what is than what ought to be; its political elite is representative, i. For the treatment of the ideological character of the army in socialism, see Nova Revija 57 and later issues, especially the articles by Spomenka Hribar.
- Dambusters: The Photographic Album of 617 Squadron at War 1943 -1945 (In Focus).
- The perfect is the enemy of the good;
- Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution | SpringerLink?
No state is neutral, and none rules out violence to preserve social order, as defined by its ruling class or elite. The difference is that liberal democracies do not consider the present as such an enemy that it should necessarily be excluded from political representation. On the contrary, they allow representation of the present via elections. In this chapter, however, we do not focus on other states but on Yugoslavia. Thus they were tolerated for much longer than one would have expected even by the most conservative factions of the political elite.
We have only applied that doctrine in consonance with our situation.
Since there is nothing new, there is no new ideology. In the aftermath of the First World War the liberal doctrine seemed victorious at least in Europe , and thus it expressed itself in its unrestricted, i. Only later were liberal concepts amended in order to respond to the issues of minorities, collective identities and group rights. Vladisavljevic takes a completely fresh approach to this topic and sheds new light upon it.
Through a balanced scholarly approach, the study places Milosevic's rise to power in a novel context. It is a stimulating argument and doubtless one that will stimulate argument. Indeed Vladisavljevic's bottom-up perspective redeems the voice and agency of the non-elite, rejecting accounts that cast them as mere puppets. That he is able to do so with such theoretical and empirical sophistication makes the argument all the more compelling and an enjoyable read.
He teaches comparative politics and the regulation of ethnonational conflict in the Graduate School. Above all, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic was fascist in practice, if not in self-identification…. Milosevic began, like earlier fascists and proto-fascists such as Georges Sorel and Mussolini, as a radical socialist who decided that nationalism provided a better weapon than the class struggle and internationalism with which to overthrow the liberal in this case, quasi-liberal order.
He centred all power in Serbia in his own hands and proceeded to tear up the Titoist settlement of the national question, much as Hitler had torn up the Versailles settlement.
Yugoslavia: The Spectre of Balkanization
As President of the League of Communists of Serbia, he effectively seized power against his Communist rivals in September He consolidated it by using Serbian party, police and media organs to carry out a mass nationalist mobilisation of the Serbian population, above all over the Kosovo issue. Milosevic became President of Serbia on 28 May This mass nationalist mobilisation used to consolidate power flowed seamlessly into ill-conceived wars of conquest…. This involved concentration camps, most notoriously at Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje in north-west Bosnia.
In July , Bosnian Serb forces conquered the East Bosnian town of Srebrenica and massacred 8, Muslim civilians, an act that constituted genocide according to the International Court of Justice. Ultimately, however, Milosevic fell because, like Hitler and Mussolini, he could not stop the boulder of nationalist mobilisation that he had set in motion from rolling; he could never rest on his laurels, but needed continuously to provoke crises and pick fights with ever-stronger opponents until he destroyed himself.
Tudjman and the HDZ waged their own war of conquest in Bosnia-Hercegovina, directed primarily against the Muslims and involving massacres and expulsions of both Muslims and Serbs and the establishment of concentration camps, particularly at Dretelj near Capljina. Tudjman was a quieter and more conservative figure than Milosevic.
Related Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization
Copyright 2019 - All Right Reserved